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Federal Tort Claims Act -Status of the National Guard
Civilian Caretaker
Plaintiffs, survivors of the pilot and co-pilot of a Capital Airlines pas-
senger plane, and Capital Airlines brought suit against the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act The suit arose as a result of a mid-air
collision between a Maryland Air National Guard jet plane and the Capital
Airlines plane. The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia found for the plaintiffs. Held: The pilot of the National Guard
plane was acting in his civilian capacity as a "caretaker"' or "technician"'
and was, therefore, an employee of the United States within the meaning
of the Federal Tort Claims Act.4 United States v. Maryland ex rel. Meyer,
322 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir., 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 954 (1964).'
In another case involving the same accident, but with certain passengers
of the Capital Airlines plane presenting the claims, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit came to the opposite conclusion, reversing
the lower court's decision. Held: The pilot, as a civilian technician, was not
a federal employee within the meaning of the act so as to render the
United States liable for his negligence.' Maryland ex rel. Levin v. United
States, 329 F.2d 722 (3d Cir., 1964), cert. granted, 85 Sup. Ct. 149
(1964).
These two opinions present the major arguments on both sides of the
question. Captain McCoy, pilot of the National Guard jet, was employed
as a caretaker of federal property allotted to the National Guard. For
this he received compensation from federal funds separate from, and in,
addition to, that which he received as a regular member of the National
Guard." The court in both cases considered two issues on the question of
federal liability; whether Captain McCoy, as a civilian technician, was a
128 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1951): This section provides:
Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts . . . shall
have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for
money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of prop-
erty, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission
of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or em-
ployment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred.
a32 U.S.C. § 709(a) (1956). This section states: "Under such regulations as the Secretary
of the . . . Air Force may prescribe, funds allotted by him for the Air National Guard may be
spent for the compensation of competent persons to care for material, armament, and equipment
of the Air National Guard."
a The two terms are interchangeable, although "technician" seems to be used more than "care-
taker."
' See United States v. Holly, 192 F.2d 221 (10th Cir. 1951); Elmo v. United States, 197 F.2d
230 (5th Cir. 1952); United States v. Duncan, 197 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1952); Courtney v.
United States, 230 F.2d 112, 57 A.L.R.2d 1444 (2d Cir. 1956); United States v. Wendt, 242 F.2d
854 (9th Cir. 1957).
'Also found in 8 Av. Cas. 17,677 (1963).
'The finding of the district courts that the sole proximate cause of the accident was the negli-
gent conduct of the National Guard pilot was not challenged in either case on appeal.
'32 U.S.C. § 709(a) (1956); see note 2 supra.
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federal employee within the Tort Claims Act;' and whether at the time
of the collision he was acting within the scope of his employment as such
a technician.'
Judge Fahy, who delivered the opinion for a unanimous court in the
Meyer decision, relied on a number of recent cases" stating that, although
a member of a National Guard unit (Army or Air National Guard) is
ordinarily not considered an employee of the United States within the
meaning of the Tort Claims Act, he acquires such status as a "civilian
caretaker."" The right of ultimate control is determinative," and to Judge
Fahy that right is in the United States, since it reserves the power to fix
the salaries of caretakers," and to issue regulations and instructions for
their employment. 4 He concluded that the functions granted by the
United States to the state adjutant general - supervision of the employ-
ment of civilian technicians-do not serve to supplant the right of ultimate
control in the Government. He wrote, "Such supervision as was lodged
in the state did not make Captain McCoy an employee of Maryland. A
foreman, for example, is not the employer of the one whose work he may
in some respects supervise."" An adjutant general's duties are to be per-
formed in accordance with subsequent federal regulations issued by the
Secretary of the Army or Air Force," so the right of control remains in
the United States.
Judge Smith, writing for the majority in the Levin case, came to the
opposite conclusion. However, he was not joined in this part of the decision
by his two associate justices, for Judge Staley dissented, and Judge Hastie
concurred only on the issue of the scope of employment. Judge Smith
'28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1949):
"Employee of the Government" includes officers or employees of any federal
agency, members of the military or naval forces of the United States, and persons
acting on behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity, temporarily or permanently
in the service of the United States, whether with or without compensation.
This statute is not sufficiently definitive, and the courts refer to general principles of agency in
determining federal employment. Thomas v. United States, 204 F. Supp. 896 (D. Vt. 1962);
Courtney v. United States, 230 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1956). Generally, the employer-employee re-
lationship is based on control or the right to control. The central issue is whether the servant is
under the control of the person or entity who is alleged to be the master. Restatement (Second),
Agency § 2 (1958).
'The Federal Tort Claims Act requires both federal employee status and negligent or wrong-
ful action within the scope of that employment. See note I supra.
'0 Williams v. United States, 189 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1951 ) ; Dover v. United States, 192 F.2d
431 (5th Cir. 1951); McCranie v. United States, 199 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 923 (1953); Slagle v. United States, 243 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1957); and Pattno v.
United States, 311 F.2d 604 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 911 (1963). But see O'Toole
v. United States, 206 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1953) which held that members of the National Guard
of the District of Columbia are federal employees within the act.
"United States v. Maryland ex. rel. Meyer, 322 F.2d 1009, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
's See note 8 supra.
1a32 U.S.C. § 709(f) (1956): "The Secretary [of the Army or Air Force] concerned shall
fix the salaries of clerks, and caretakers authorized to be employed under this section, and shall
designate the person to employ them."
'4 Authority to employ civilian personnel as caretakers (technicians) is vested in the state ad-
jutant general, "subject to the provisions of law and such instructions as may be subsequently
issued" under United States authority. Air National Guard Regulations No. 40-01, 20 Dec. 1954.
" United States v. Maryland ex rel. Meyer, supra note 11, at 1013.
"0 Air National Guard Regulations No. 40-01, 20 Dec. 1954; see note 14 supra.
"7 Judge Hastie concurred on the question of scope of employment, but he added: "I do not
reach the more difficult and far-reaching question, whether a civilian caretaker and technician . . .
is a federal employee within the meaning of the F.T.C.A." In his dissent, Judge Staley concluded
that a civilian caretaker is a federal employee, and that Captain McCoy was acting within the
scope of his employment as a caretaker. Maryland ex rel. Levin v. United States, 329 F.2d 722,
732-34 (3d Cir. 1964).
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first considered the cases which state that the federally recognized mem-
bers of National Guard units'8 not in active service" are not employees
of the United States within the meaning of the Federal Tort Claims Act."
He said that in those cases the following facts were regarded as of no signifi-
cance: "The Guard member had qualified for federal recognition, was,
compensated directly from federal funds," and was in possession and con-
trol of a federally owned vehicle involved in the accident." 2 However,
in the Meyer case and in other cases upon which the court in that decision
relied, these same facts were regarded as "significant and somewhat de-
terminative."" Judge Smith also stated, "It is difficult for us to perceive
how factors may be considered immaterial in one situation and material in
another which is comparable." 4 To him the distinctions made between the
two groups of cases were untenable. He concluded that the powers given
to the Secretary of the Army or Air Force under the statutes do not place
civilian technicians in a category as federal employees:
It is evident that the only purposes of the pertinent statutes, and the
regulations promulgated thereunder, were to insure the effective organization
of the National Guard and to protect federal funds against unrestricted
expenditure, both in the national interest. There is nothing in the legislation
which would indicate that it was the intent of Congress to either interfere
with the right of the states to organize the Guard or deprive the states of
the right to employ, supervise and control such civilian personnel as were
deemed essential to the support of the Guard. We are of the opinion that in
their relationships to the United States there is no distinction between a
federally recognized member of the Guard and a federally recognized
maintenance technician employed in his civilian capacity."
Consideration of the second issue (whether the deceased pilot was acting
within the scope of his employment as a civilian technician) again resulted
in conflicting decisions. A question of fact was involved which, under
the Federal Tort Claims Act, is to be decided according to the applicable
state law. In this case, Maryland law, the applicable law, and the law
generally28 is that an employer is liable for personal injury or death caused
by the tortious conduct of his employee only if at the time of the accident
the employee was engaged in an activity within the scope of his employ-
ment and in furtherance of objectives within his line of duty. The court
in the Meyer case found that Captain McCoy was, in evaluating the per-
formance of the aircraft and its equipment, exercising his duties as a civil-
ian technician. Judge Fahy relied principally on the testimony of National
" "Federal recognition means acknowledgment by the Federal Government that a person ap-
pointed to an authorized grade and position vacancy in the National Guard meets the prescribed
Federal standards for such grade and position." 32 U.S.C. App. § 1101.3 (1956).
"0 At the time of the accident involved in these cases the Maryland National Guard had not
been placed in active federal service.
2 Cases cited note 10 supra.
2" Sums are appropriated annually by Congress for the support of the National Guard, to be
apportioned as the regulations provide. 32 U.S.C. §§ 106-07 (1956).
22Maryland ex rel. Levin v. United States, 329 F.2d 722, 727 (3d Cir. 1964).
21 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 See 32 U.S.C. § 709 (1956), note 13 supra. See also Air National Guard Regulations No.
40-01, 20 Dec. 1954, note 14 supra.
21 Maryland ex rel. Levin v. United States, supra note 22, at 729.2 7 See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1951), note 1 supra.
"See 150 A.L.R. 1346 (1944).
28 Lewis v. Accelerated Transport-Pony Express, Inc., 219 Md. 252, 148 A.2d 783 (1959).
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Guard officers. However, in the Levin case, Judge Smith, with Judge Hastie
concurring,"0 stated that a technician's duties are exercised only on a
"functional check flight" which requires a minimum of two men. There
being only one qualified crewman, this flight could not qualify; and conse-
quently, Captain McCoy was not exercising his duties as a civilian tech-
nician.
A third issue was raised in the Meyer decision, although it was not dis-
cussed in Levin. It concerns the National Guard Claims Act, 1 which pro-
vides, in part, that the Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Air Force,
or the Judge Advocate General may settle and pay a claim against the
United States arising out of the acts of a National Guard member, expressly
including the civilian technician. The amount that may be paid is limited
to 5,000 dollars, and the National Guardsman must have acted within the
scope of his authority. The question was raised whether this is an exclusive
remedy, so that a claim against the United States arising out of an action
by a member of a National Guard unit, whether a civilian technician or not,
must be brought under the National Guard Claims Act.3' The court
decided that the legislative intent was not such as to limit liability of the
Government for the negligent acts of its employees. The act merely pro-
vides an alternate remedy. That is, the claimant may choose to present
his case under the National Guard Claims Act, which limits any payment
to 5,000 dollars; or he may proceed under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
which has no such limitation. Judge Fahy concluded that the only differ-
ence is that the first is an administrative remedy, while the second is a
judicial one. Although this issue was not raised in the Levin opinion, it
should come before the Supreme Court if upon rehearing the petition for
writ of certiorari in the Meyer case is granted. Obviously, it will only be
important if the Court decides that the civilian technician is a federal em-
ployee. For the present, the Meyer case provides the appellate case precedent
on this issue.
Of the two decisions it would seem that Judge Fahy has more percep-
tively analyzed the congressional intent. In view of the relatively extensive
regulation concerning civilian technicians," it is apparent that Congress has
placed them in a separate category. Regulations have been established, 4
regarding not only their qualifications, responsibilities and duties, but also
concerning such matters as their political activities," old age and survivors'
benefits, 0 and unemployment benefits, 7 among others. The controlling
question is whether through such regulations the Government has re-
tained the right of control of these technicians so as to make them federal
employees." It is true, as Judge Smith points out in the Levin case, that
the state adjutant general under these same regulations is authorized to
30 See note 17 supra.
"' 32 U.S.C. § 715 (Supp. V, 1962).
" For an argument that the act is exclusive, see The National Guard Claims Act, 24 Fed. B.J.
197 (No. 2, 1964).
33 32 U.S.C. § 709 (1956); Air National Guard Regulations No. 40-01, 20 Dec. 1954; No.
40-101, 2 Jan. 1964; Air National Guard Civilian Personnel Manual (March 1958).
34See Air National Guard Regulations No. 40-101, 2 Jan. 1964.
3' Air National Guard Regulations No. 40-101, 2 Jan. 1964: This section states: "[National
Guard technicians] fall within the purview of the so-called Hatch Act (act of Aug. 2, 1939
(53 Stat. 1147) as amended (5 U.S.C.) 118i et seq.)."
' Id., chapter 7, section 3.
37 Id., chapter 3.
as See note 8 supra.
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employ, fix rates of pay (within maximum limits), establish work hours
(a maximum of forty hours per week), and supervise and discharge em-
ployees. But as he also points out, these powers are "subject to the pro-
visions of law and such instructions as may be subsequently issued by the
Chief, National Guard Bureau." 9 It is evident that the Government has
set out detailed "provisions" and "instructions" concerning these particular
employees, as discussed above. No such detailed regulation is made for the
regular National Guard member. These technicians have a special job-
to care for federal property-for which they are specially compensated
and separately regulated. Captain McCoy must be either an employee of
the state of Maryland or of the United States. The state is authorized to
employ him, to supervise him, and to discharge him; but in doing so it is
limited by a multitude of federal regulations concerning most phases of
his employment. Judge Fahy wrote: "The functions lodged by the United
States in the State Adjutant General did not serve to supplant this right of
control in the United States . . . for too much begins and remains with
the United States in the case of these caretakers of federal property."' The
civilian technician, therefore, is a federal employee within the Federal
Tort Claims Act.
The question remains whether the National Guard Claims Act is an
exclusive remedy for one injured by the acts of the technician. Judge
Fahy concluded that the remedy is not exclusive, but alternative. That
seems to be the better view, although there is some argument to the con-
trary.' There is nothing in that act which indicates that it is to be ex-
clusive, or that it is to supersede the Federal Tort Claims Act. One is a
judicial remedy; the other, an administrative one, and there is no ex-
pression of an intent by Congress to exclude one or the other. To give the
act such an interpretation is to strain the meaning clearly expressed. Its
purpose is to provide a remedy where there might otherwise be none.
Leo M. Favrot
As the journal goes to print, the opinion of the Supreme Court,
affirming the decision in the Levin case, has been received. The Court
holds that the "civilian caretaker" is not a federal, but a state em-
ployee. Maryland ex rel. Levin v. United States, 33 U.S.L. Week
4405 (U.S. May 3, 1965). Along with Mr. Justice Douglas, the
writer respectfully dissents.
L.M.F.
" Maryland ex rel. Levin v. United States, supra note 22, at 728, taken from Air National
Guard Regulations 40-01, 20 Dec. 1954.
40 United States v. Maryland ex -rel. Meyer, supra note 11, at 1013.
41 See note 32 supra.
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Administrative Law - Primary Jurisdiction
Antitrust Exemption
In federal district court,' Trans World Airlines [hereinafter TWA]
obtained a default judgment against Howard Hughes and Hughes Tool
Company (Toolco) in an antitrust suit wherein it was alleged that the
defendants had attempted to monopolize interstate and foreign commerce
in the furnishing of aircraft.2 Toolco (owned one hundred per cent by
Hughes) is TWA's majority stockholder, so in addition to treble damages
and injunctive relief, TWA sought divestiture of Toolco's interest in TWA,
which question was retained for further consideration. Defendants were
granted leave to appeal limited to two questions: (1) whether the district
court lacked jurisdiction of the treble damage action by reason of primary
jurisdiction in the Civil Aeronautics Board [hereinafter CAB], and (2)
whether the issuance of control and modified control orders by the CAB
permitting defendants to take certain actions constituted a good defense to
TWA's antitrust claims. Held: There is neither exclusive nor primary juris-
diction of this matter in the CAB. Thus, the district court had jurisdiction
of the suit and the CAB orders did not immunize defendants from the
operation of the antitrust laws. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 332
F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1964), petition for cert. dismissed, 85 Sup. Ct. 934
(1965).
I. BACKGROUND--EXEMPTION, PRIMARY JURISDICTION, AND SUPERSESSION
The conflict between regulation of industry through administrative
agencies and the federal antitrust laws remains a problem in the field of
federal administrative law. In general, there have been two basic ap-
proaches to solving this conflict. One approach has been to enact legislative
exemptions from the operation of the antitrust laws,' thus placing exclu-
sive jurisdiction of certain matters with the federal agency. The other
approach has been through court coordination of the regulatory scheme
and the antitrust laws by accommodation of the conflicting policies of
comprehensive regulation on the one hand and free and open competition
on the other, with the overriding consideration being to serve the public
interest.4 This accommodation has been mainly effectuated by the use of
1Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 214 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
Id. at 108. TWA alleged that defendants attempted to restrain commerce by providing financ-
ing of the acquisition by TWA of aircraft only upon the condition that TWA acquire all such air-
craft from Toolco; that TWA was required to boycott all suppliers of aircraft except Toolco in
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act; and that sales and leases of jet-powered aircraft were
made on condition that the purchaser or lessee would not buy or lease the goods of any competitor
of the vendor or lessor, in violation of Section 3 of the Clayton Act.
3See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958) (exempting from the operation of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act transactions approved within their authority by the CAB, FCC, FPC, ICC, FMB, Secretary of
Agriculture and, in some cases, the SEC); 46 U.S.C. § 814 (Supp. V 1961) (rate fixing and other
agreements between water carriers approved by the FMB) ; 47 U.S.C. § 221 (a) (1958) (telephone
mergers approved by the FCC); 49 U.S.C. § 5 (1958) (railroad mergers approved by the ICC);
and 49 U.S.C. § 5b (1958) (agreements between carriers involving rates approved by the ICC).
4 Barrow, Antitrust and the Regulated Industry: Promoting Competition in Broadcasting, 1964
Duke L.J. 282.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.' The doctrine "applies where a claim
is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever en-
forcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a
regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body; and in such cases, the judicial process is suspended
pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its views. '
Note that the doctrine applies only when jurisdiction is concurrent in
both the agency and the court, and merely provides the answer as to
whether a court or an agency should initially decide a particular issue.
This is to be distinguished from the doctrine of exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies which "applies where a claim is cognizable in the first
instance by an administrative agency alone."'
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction has been said to be based on one,
or both, of two reasons:' a need for uniformity of regulation," and de-
ference to administrative expertise." The determination of whether the
court should yield to an agency's primary jurisdiction can properly be
called a jurisdictional ruling.1 If a defendant asserts the defense of primary
jurisdiction, the court must make a "judicial appraisal of the . . . inter-
relation of legislation . . . and other provisions of law which standing
alone would empower a court to proceed. . . ."" If the need for uniformity
is the basis, the doctrine is obligatory; that is, the court must require the
parties to resort first to the agency.13 But, it would seem that prior sub-
mission of the case to an agency is discretionary to the extent of deter-
mining what cases require administrative expertise. The Supreme Court
has said, however, that "where Congress has provided statutory review
procedures designed to permit agency expertise to be brought to bear on
particular problems, those procedures are to be exclusive."'" Yet a man-
damus petition was dismissed by a federal court of appeals because there
was no clear statutory requirement of primary jurisdiction."
The cornerstone of primary jurisdiction is Texas E Pacific Ry. v. Abilene
Cotton Oil Co.," where the rule was originally designed to secure uniform-
'See generally 3 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 19 (1958); Jaffee, Primary Jurisdiction,
77 Harv. L. Rev. 1037 (1964); Convisser, Primary Jurisdiction: The Rule and Its Rationalizations,
65 Yale L.J. 315 (1956); Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries:
An Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 436 (1954); R. von Mehren, The
Antitrust Laws and Regulated Industries: The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, 67 Harv. L. Rev.
929 (1954); Latta, Primary Jurisdiction in the Regulated Industries and The Antitrust Laws,
30 Cincinnati L. Rev. 261 (1961); Mitchell, Primary Jurisdiction-What It Is and What It Is Not,
13 ABA Antitrust Section Rep. 26 (1958); McGovern, Types of Questions Over Which Adminis-
trative Agencies Do Not Have Primary Jurisdiction, 13 ABA Antitrust Section Rep. 57 (1958);
Fulda, A Critique of the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, 13 ABA Antitrust Section Rep. 68
(1958); Comment, 26 U. Chi. L. Rev. 598 (1959).
'United States v. Western Pacific Ry., 352 U.S. 59, 63-64 (1956).
'Id. at 63.
sId. at 64.
'Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907); Keogh v. Chicago &
N.W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
"Great Northern Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285 (1922); Far East Conference
v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952).
1 American Airlines, Inc. v. Forman, 204 F.2d 230 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 346 U.S. 806 (1953).1 1d. at 232-33.
"3Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
"4 Whitney National Bank in Jefferson Parish v. Bank of New Orleans and Trust Co., 85 S. Ct.
551, 557 (1965).
15 American Airlines, Inc. v. Forman, supra note 11. For a discussion of the facts involved see
text accompanying note 65 infra.
1'204 U.S. 426 (1907).
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ity of railroad rates. The Court held that a shipper seeking reparation
because of an alleged unreasonable rate must primarily invoke redress
through the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). The rule was then
expanded to secure uniformity of tariff construction. In Texas & Pacific
Ky. v. American Tie," it was held that the determination of whether the
term "lumber" in a tariff included oak railroad ties was a question of fact
for the ICC. The Court said there was a need for uniformity since there
was uncertainty as to whether "lumber" was used in an "ordinary" or a
"special" sense. However, in Great Northern Ry. v. Merchants Elevator
Co.," the Court held that in tariff construction, when "the words . . . are
used in their ordinary meaning,"" a solely legal question is presented and
the need for primary jurisdiction disappears. When primary jurisdiction
based on uniformity is required, the Court said, it is "because the enquiry
is essentially one of fact and of discretion in technical matters; and uni-
formity can be secured only if its determination is left to the Commis-
sion."2 In Hewitt-Robins v. Eastern Freight-Ways,2' the requirement of
uniformity was held to be sufficiently served by allowing the ICC to de-
termine the reasonableness of a routing practice, with a subsequent de-
termination by a court of a common-law damage action.
The opinion in Great Northern also suggested the other rationale for
primary jurisdiction-expertise.2 2 This basis for the doctrine was then
approved and ably explained by Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Far East
Conference v. United States.' In that case, an organization of carriers
had established a dual-rate system to give a lower rate to shippers who
dealt exclusively with members of their conference. The Court dismissed
an antitrust suit to give the Federal Maritime Board (FMB) an oppor-
tunity to hold a hearing and approve the dual-rate system. After the
FMB gave its approval, the Court, in FMB v. Isbrandtsen Co., 4 affirmed
a decision which had set the approved rates aside. It was held that primary
jurisdiction in the FMB in the first instance did not give it the last word
in approving or disapproving the system. The Court said that in Far East
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction was applied because "practical con-
17234 U.S. 138 (1914).
"259 U.S. 285 (1922). A shipper billed wheat to a point to be inspected and reconsigned to
its ultimate destination. Under a railroad rule the charge for reconsignment was not applicable to
grain "held . . . for inspection and disposition orders incident thereto .. ." The dispute arose over
determination of whether an order for reconsignment after inspection was a "disposition order in-
cident" to consignment. 259 U.S. at 288-89.
"Id. at 291.
21 Ibid.
"371 U.S. 84 (1962).
259 U.S. at 291. "[A]cquaintance with many intricate facts of transportation . . . is com-
monly found only in a body of experts .... "
28342 U.S. 570, 574-75 (1952).
It is "now firmly established, that in cases raising issues of fact not within the con-
ventional experience of judges or cases requiring the exercise of administrative dis-
cretion, agencies created by Congress for regulating the subject matter should not be
passed over. This is so even though the facts after they have been appraised by spe-
cialized competence serve as a premise for legal consequences to be judicially defined.
Uniformity and consistency in the regulation of business entrusted to a particular
agency are secured, and the limited functions of review by the judiciary are more
rationally exercised, by preliminary resort for ascertaining and interpreting the cir-
cumstances underlying legal issues to agencies that are better equipped than the courts
by specialization, by insight gained through experience, and by more flexible procedure.
Cf. FMB v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481, 500-24 (1958) (Justice Frankfurter's dissenting
opinion).
24356 U.S. 481 (1958).
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siderations dictate" that an agency makes a "preliminary, comprehensive
investigation of all the facts," analyze them, and apply "to them the
statutory scheme as it is construed."2 The Court seemed to be holding
that the dual-rate system was invalid as a matter of law. Apparently then,
there was presented a question of law requiring preliminary analysis in-
volving expertise.
The question which now often plagues the courts is under what cir-
cumstances they should defer to administrative expertise. The obvious
cases might be those involving the reasonableness of a company's practices
established pursuant to agency regulations,- or perhaps rate classification
questions, or any other cases containing problems which require "expert
knowledge of multitudinous detail of intricate nature in a technical field."27
However, where "no special familiarity with the complicated factual
situations peculiar to the field is imposed,"" why should a court defer to
an agency? Although Great Northern also confined expertise to technical
matters,2 one writer has suggested that this qualification is not a limitation
of real significance."0 Professor Jaffee has criticized overworking expertise
and has suggested that primary jurisdiction situations cannot be resolved
by this single abstraction. 1 He reads Great Northern as recognizing that
expertness is a question of degree. It is submitted, then, that there is no
real guide as to when the need for expertise should call for the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction to be applied; rather the court will look at each indi-
vidual case and compare its facts to the statutory grant of power and the
statutory purpose.
It must be remembered that the primary jurisdiction doctrine only re-
quires that the court suspend proceedings until the agency makes certain
fact findings."3 The agency can sharpen facts and issues within its area of
specialization, enabling the court to benefit from whatever contributions
the agency can make to the solution. However, because the doctrine
should not be used to force litigants to go through an expensive and de-
layed proceeding, inadequacy of a possible remedy before an agency may
prevent its application.' Although, if some parts of the case are within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the agency, the doctrine may be applied even
though total relief is not possible in the agency."
Supersession has also been suggested as a reason for recognizing an
agency's primary jurisdiction. However, when regulatory statutes within
the particular industry supersede the antitrust statutes, the only court
'
2 Id. at 498.
20 See Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951); Adler v. Chicago and
Southern Air Lines, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 366 (E.D. Mo. 1941).
2'Trans-Pacific Airlines, Ltd. v. Hawaiian Airlines, Ltd., 174 F.2d 63, 66 (9th Cir. 1949).
2 Ibid.
29259 U.S. 285, 291 (1922).
'oConvisser, supra note 5, at 330.
91 Jaffee, supra note 5, at 1041.
2id. at 1045.
"aUnited States v. Western Pacific Ry., 352 U.S. 59 (1956); FMB v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S.
481 (1958); see generally 3 Davis, supra note 5, at § 19.01.
"Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945). It was held that an antitrust injunction
could not be delayed by assertion of primary jurisdiction when the conduct complained of is not
subject to administrative control, and, therefore no remedy existed under the regulatory act.
"Thompson v. Texas Mexican Ry., 328 U.S. 134 (1946); General American Tank Car Corp.
v. Eldorado Terminal Co., 308 U.S. 422 (1940).
"Latta, supra note 5, at 267.
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action can be judicial review as given in the Administrative Procedure
Act."' Thus, supersession is the judicial pronouncement of implied legisla-
tive exemption," and the agency has primary and exclusive jurisdiction
over some matters alleged to be antitrust questions. Hence, supersession is
not within the conventional meaning of primary jurisdiction,"' although
it has not always been clearly differentiated by the courts."0
But when are the antitrust laws superseded by regulatory statutes?
Cases of this sort are found only where there is "plain repugnancy between
the antitrust and regulatory provisions."" Repeals by implication are not
favored,2 and absent a "clear expression" of an intent to supersede the
antitrust laws, any statutory power of exemption will be strictly con-
strued.' One ground for supersession might be a pervasive regulatory
scheme in an industry. This was suggested in United States v. Radio Cor-
poration of America [hereinafter RCA]," where the Supreme Court found
that the Communications Act did not embody a "pervasive regulatory
scheme" 5 and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) was not
empowered to decide antitrust issues as such. It was held that an antitrust
action lay despite prior approval of the conduct by the FCC. Since the
Commission had already decided all the questions it was going to decide,
the justification for primary jurisdiction in the FCC was also wanting.
The question was really, therefore, one of estoppel, i.e., was the Department
of Justice estopped from bringing this action because of prior approval
by another arm of the Government? Then, in California v. Federal Power
Commission," the Court found no pervasive regulatory scheme in the
Natural Gas Act,7 and thus no supersession.
If a regulatory statute exempts a specified practice or agreement, once
such practice or agreement has been approved by an agency, no cause of
action for violation of the antitrust laws will lie. However, exemption
orders will be narrowly construed. And, it appears that express agency
approval is the only way to be exempted under such a statute." In
Isbrandtsen the Court said that until the FMB approves and thus legalizes
conduct, any price-fixing agreements by shippers remain subject to the
antitrust laws, even though the Board may be accorded primary jurisdic-
tion. Furthermore, it has been held that the question of whether an
agency has or has not approved a particular transaction is a question of
3 60 Star. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-42 (1958); see Latta, supra note 5, at 276-77.
"SNote, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 673, 681 (1958).
"'McGovern, supra note 5, at 62.
4See Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952). Although in Far East the
Supreme Court purported to follow a previous holding in United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard
S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474 (1932), that the "Shipping Act . . . supersedes the antitrust laws," and
ordered the complaint dismissed, it stated that "a similar suit is easily initiated later, if appro-
priate." 342 U.S. at 576-77. See generally Mitchell, supra note 5, at 29-31.
4' United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963).
2 United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939).
43 United States Alkali Export Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196, 206 (1945).
44358 U.S. 334 (1959).
45id. at 350.
46 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962).
47 52 Stat. 833, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1938).
48 United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S.
439 (1945).
"See United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 226-27 (1940). "Congress had
specified the precise manner and method of securing immunity. None other would suffice." See
Fulda, supra note 5, at 70.
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law for the court and not the agency." A fortiori, it is the province of
the court to determine what conduct can be approved by an agency."
According to Professor Fulda's interpretation of Isbrandtsen, a court
decision that an agency has no legal power to approve a particular agree-
ment or conduct under any circumstances, should be a bar to primary
jurisdiction in the agency.
II. THE CAB-EXEMPTION, PRIMARY JURISDICTION, AND SUPERSESSION
The Civil Aeronautics Act, as amended by the Federal Aviation Act of
1958, 5' vests jurisdiction in the CAB to regulate routes" and rates.55 The
Board also has power to issue orders approving consolidations, mergers,
purchases and acquisitions of control of air carriers by other carriers or
any person engaged in any other phase of aeronautics," interlocking re-
lations,57 and pooling arrangements,0 thus exempting from operation of
the antitrust laws any person affected by such order "insofar as may be
necessary to enable such person to do anything authorized, approved, or
required by such order." 9 The act also contains a saving clause which
provides that "nothing contained in this chapter shall in any way abridge
or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the
provisions of this act are in addition to such remedies."" ° Furthermore, the
Board is empowered to investigate and enjoin "unfair or deceptive prac-
tices" or "unfair methods of competition" by air carriers.0 '
An antitrust case which exemplified the Board's power of exemption
was Putnam v. Air Transport Ass'n of America." The action was by a
travel agency operator against certain domestic airlines, an airline trade
association and a division of the association. The airlines had agreed that
they would sell tickets through only those travel agencies which had con-
tracts with their trade association division and had empowered the division
to make and cancel such contracts. Since the Board had approved this
specific arrangement it was held that all the defendants were exempt from
the operation of the antitrust laws in the appointment and removal of
travel agencies under the Board order.
Although it is the province of the courts to say what their function is
under the act, 3 there has been some conflict in decisions when the courts
have tried to apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine to the CAB. In
" River Plate & Brazil Conferences v. Pressed Steel Car Co., 227 F.2d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 1955).
"When all that remains is for the Court to say what the plain words of the statute mean and
whether the Board has acted, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply."
"See FMB v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958).
52 Fulda, Competition in the Regulated Industries: Transportation 443 (1961).
5372 Stat. 754, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1958), amending ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (1938)
[hereinafter cited solely to 49 U.S.C.].
54§ 401, 49 U.S.C. S 1371 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (Supp. V 1962).
5§ 404, 49 U.S.C. § 1374 (1958).
56 408, 49 U.S.C. 5 1378 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1378 (Supp. V 1960).
57 § 409, 49 U.S.C. § 1379 (1958).
§o5 412, 49 U.S.C. § 1382 (1958).
9 414, 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1958).
0o§ 1106, 49 U.S.C. § 1506 (1958).
"s§ 411, 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1958).
42 112 F. Supp. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
" Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360, 364 (S.D.Cal. 1961). "Although the
Civil Aeronautics Act sets forth the extent of the powers and duties of the administrative authority,
it fails to delineate the scope of such functions as are necessarily left to the judiciary under the
Act, thus confronting the courts with this responsibility."
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S.S.W., Inc. v. Air Transport Ass'n of America,: primary jurisdiction was
found to lie in the CAB in a case involving an antitrust matter. The com-
plaint alleged that defendant had hindered and prevented plaintiff from
obtaining ticket agencies, prevented competition, caused delay and refused
vital maintenance at airports. Since the provisions of the Civil Aeronautics
Act covered the dominant facts alleged, the Board was held to have
primary jurisdiction to issue cease and desist orders against unfair or de-
ceptive practices. Because the plaintiff had sought damages as well as in-
junctive relief, the district court was instructed to retain jurisdiction for
possible injunctive relief against such alleged practices as were not covered
by the act and to award damages, if any. Another court, however, took a
different view of the primary jurisdiction to be properly accorded the
CAB. In Slick Airways v. American Airlines, Inc.," there was alleged a
conspiracy to monopolize and restrain trade by excluding the plaintiff
from the field of air freight transportation. The plaintiff sought an in-
junction and damages. Although it seemed that the charged conduct was
again subject to the Civil Aeronautics Act, the court held contra, and said
that the primary jurisdiction doctrine did not apply because the CAB
could not provide remedial relief for past injuries to the plaintiff. It went
on to say that "a conspiracy to restrain trade . . . being inherently secre-
tive and furtive in nature is not the type of subject matter which would
be dealt with by an order made under [Sec. 408 of the Civil Aeronautics
Act"] . . . so as to be relieved from the operation of the antitrust laws."6
The apparent conflict in the above two cases was recognized by the
court in Apgar Travel Agency, Inc. v. International Air Transport Ass'n."
The court discussed the opinions in both S.S.W. and Slick and said it
would accept the S.S.W. reasoning. Again, this was an action for damages
and injunctive relief for conspiracy to drive a ticket agency out of busi-
ness because of its service to nonscheduled carriers. The primary jurisdiction
doctrine was held applicable even though the Board did not possess re-
medial jurisdiction to determine the existence of a conspiracy under anti-
trust laws. Rather, the controlling factor, the court said, was that "con-
siderations of administrative expertness and uniformity of regulation"6
were significantly involved.
There is still some uncertainty in the doctrine's applicability, however.
A later case, although not involving an antitrust action, seemed to apply
the Slick reasoning. In Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., °
it was held that since the CAB had no power to grant reparation for past
misconduct or to approve past misconduct, an action by passengers who
alleged violation of a statute prohibiting discrimination was not within
the CAB's primary jurisdiction. The lack of the Board's power to give
damages was stressed again in a case finding a cause of action existing in
the federal courts. However, in two other common-law damage actions,
64191 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
65 107 F. Supp. 199 (D.N.J. 1952), appeal dismissed 204 F.2d 230 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 806 (1953).
66 Supra note 56.
67 107 F. Supp. at 207.
68 107 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
19 Id. at 712.
70229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956).
" Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360, 364-65 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
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the CAB was held to have primary jurisdiction to determine reasonable-
ness of an air carrier's practices and rules,"2 although the doctrine would
not have applied if the issue had been a violation of a rule."
While all of these cases had discussed the CAB's primary jurisdiction,
when Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States" [hereinafter
Panagra] came to the Supreme Court it was held that the antitrust laws
had been superseded by Section 411 of the Civil Aeronautics Act," which
invests the Board with power to issue cease and desist orders to protect
the public interest from air carriers who engage in "unfair .. .practices
or unfair methods of competition." An injunction was sought by the
government alleging that the defendant airline had violated antitrust laws
by dividing territories and allocating routes between itself and another
airline."6 The Court found that the type of activities alleged were basic
to the regulatory scheme," and that the Board had sufficient power to
either approve or enjoin the activity." However, the Court refused to hold
that there were no antitrust violations left to enforce,' and made it clear
the decision was confined to the "narrow questions presented,""s which
involved the "division of territories, allocation of routes, and the affiliation
of common carriers with air carriers."' Furthermore, the Court did not
say whether or not a private party could bring a civil suit in the courts;
rather it indicated that if damages had been sought this might have been
a case of primary jurisdiction rather than supersession."s
Panagra helps to show the spectrum of the supersession theory as it
now stands. Here the matters involved were basic to a regulatory scheme,
and the antitrust laws were superseded to the extent that alleged unlawful
conduct could be approved or enjoined. The RCA case, on the other hand,
illustrates that in an industry where there is no pervasive regulatory
scheme, the antitrust laws are not superseded when the alleged unlawful
conduct is not subject to agency approval. Therefore, unless the court
72 Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951); Adler v. Chicago and South-
ern Air Lines, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 366 (E.D. Mo. 1941).
"CAB v. Modern Air Transport, Inc., 179 F.2d 622, 624 (2d Cir. 1950).
'4371 U.S. 296 (1963). See Davis supra note 5, at 12 (Supp. 1963); 1963 U. Ill. L.F. 284;
1963 Duke L.J. 743; 63 Colum. L. Rev. 923 (1963); 38 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 593 (1963).
7' Supra note 61.
71 371 U.S. at 298. Pan American, WX'.R. Grace & Co., and Panagra (the first two defendants
named each owned fifty per cent of the latter) were charged with violation of Sections 1, 2 and 3
of the Sherman Act. It was alleged that a market division of air traffic in South America was part
of a 1929 agreement by which Panagra was formed; that Pan American and Grace conspired to
monopolize a portion of the air routes between the United States and South America; and that
Pan American used "its s0% control over Panagra to prevent it from securing authority from the
CAB to extend its route from the Canal Zone to the United States."
" Note the seeming constriction in Panagra's test (matters basic to the regulatory scheme) from
the test in RCA, supra note 44 (an entire Act of Congress constituting a pervasive regulatory
scheme).
78 Although Justice Brennan, dissenting, doubts the Board's power to approve the activities
alleged. 371 U.S. at 332.
7' 371 U.S. at 305.
8 Id. at 313.
S5 1d. at 312.
82 In a footnote, the Court considered what the situation would have been if a remedy (such
as the award of damages) had been sought which the CAB could not give: "If it were clear that
there was a remedy in this civil antitrust suit that was not available in a section 411 proceeding
before the C.A.B., we would have the kind of problem presented . . .where litigation is held by
a court until the basic facts and findings are first determined by the adminsitrative agency, so
that the judicial remedy, not available in the other proceeding, can be granted." 371 U.S. at 313
n. 19.
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finds a regulatory scheme pervasive, the limit to which supersession can
be extended depends upon the determination of which matters are basic.
This assumes, of course, that the agency can grant the type of relief
sought, or can at least approve the conduct alleged to be unlawful. In
the final analysis, however, supersession might merely depend on whether
the critical issues posed in the antitrust case actually fall within the policy-
making competence of the regulatory agency."
III. TWA v. HUGHES
The court here unanimously found no exclusive or primary jurisdiction
in the CAB and no immunity of the defendants from the operation of
the antitrust laws."
Toolco had contended that modifications of the original control order,"
approving specific intercompany transactions involving the acquisition of
aircraft," constituted a good defense to this antitrust suit. 7 The court
said, however, that CAB approval did not extend beyond the transactions
expressly ruled upon by the Board.8 It said that "these individual and
narrow Board orders" could not carry "approval of every transaction
which Toolco might choose to effect in the exercise of control" without
perverting the "entire regulatory structure of the Aviation Act."'8 None
of the activities engaged in by Toolco, alleged to be in violation of the
antitrust laws, were necessary to the exercise of Toolco's control relation-
ship under the Board orders."
Toolco alternatively had asserted that under the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Panagra, the antitrust laws had been superseded to the extent that
Congress had placed within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CAB the
regulation of everything which might flow from approved transactions.'
But the court noted "striking dissimilarities between the operative facts in
Panagra and those in the instant case": (1) in Panagra the CAB had
power to deal with alleged unlawful activities directly, while in this case
the alleged activities were unrelated to any specific function of the Board;
(2) in Panagra two of the defendants were air carriers clearly subject to
the sanctions available to the CAB under Section 411 of the Civil Aero-
nautics Act," but in this case none of the defendants was an air carrier
subject to the sanctions authorized by section 411; and (3) here, TWA
was seeking damages, while in Panagra the Government was seeking in-
junctive relief.'3 In determining questions of exclusive jurisdiction, the
court said the issue was whether the federal courts had been excluded from
" McGovern, Types of Questions Over Which Administrative Agencies Do Not Have Primary
Jurisdiction, 13 ABA Antitrust Section Rep. $7, 62 (1958).
"Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 332 F.2d 602, 610 (2d Cir. 1964). "Title 49 U.S.C.
S 1384 extends such immunity only 'insofar as may be necessary to enable such person to do any-
thing authorized, approved or required by such order'."
S"Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., Control by Hughes Tool Company, 6 C.A.B. 153
(1944).
88 332 F.2d at 610. "In each case, however, the Board's order states merely the specific terms
of the transaction and none of the accompanying conditions which allegedly were foisted on TWA."
S7 id. at 610.
"Ibid.
"Ibid.
"Ibid. Cf. Putnam v. Air Transport Ass'n of America, supra note 62.
" 332 F.2d at 608.
92 Supra note 61.
"332 F.2d at 607-09.
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consideration of the activities by Congress, not whether the CAB could
consider such matters. 4 Noting the "basic to the regulatory scheme" test
of Panagra, the court herein held that TWA's complaint drew into issue
activities that fell "without the ambit of that small fraction of antitrust
problems placed within the Board's exclusive jurisdiction.""
In dismissing Toolco's primary jurisdiction argument, the court recog-
nized the CAB's expertise "in fashioning public policy with regard to the
development of the commercial air industry through the acquisition of
control over air carriers,""' but saw no need for the exercise of such ex-
pertise in dealing with the charges alleged by TWA. Furthermore, it
said there was no need "for a uniformity of policy with regard to the
consideration of the validity of individual transactions effected between
an air carrier and its controller which are alleged to be unlawful under
the antitrust laws. '
IV. CONCLUSION
These cases involving airlines thus indicate that the subject matter of
an antitrust- suit may be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CAB
only when Board action has exempted the conduct in question or where
the action concerns matters basic to the regulatory scheme which are
"precise ingredients of the Board's authority. . . ."" If a complaint alleges
unlawful activities outside the scope of the Board's power or seeks damages,
then the antitrust laws are not superseded."
In the light of the instant case, Panagra lacks sweeping application to
other situations where the matters involved are not precise ingredients of
the Board's authority. Rather, TWA v. Hughes lies somewhere between
Panagra and RCA in discussing supersession. Reasonable limits must be
placed upon the exclusive jurisdiction of regulatory agencies. Congress
has provided that the primary responsibility of the Government for ferret-
ing out antitrust violations should be with the Department of Justice and
has designated that a federal court will be the primary forum for the
determination of such matters. To have found supersession here would
have paved the way toward making the CAB an arbiter in all private
antitrust cases involving an airline.
In the area of primary jurisdiction, there still appears to be unresolved
conflict in applying the doctrine to the CAB in antitrust matters. Al-
though the cases in which the Board has been accorded primary jurisdiction
have involved actions against air carriers where the Board has power to
'4 Id. at 609.
" Ibid. For another example of this "small fraction" of antitrust problems, see Trans-Pacific
Airlines, Ltd. v. Hawaiian Airlines, Ltd., 174 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1949). Defendant, in an antitrust
action, was registered as a non-certificated, irregular air carrier under CAB economic regulations,
and was thus exempted from the Civil Aeronautics Act's requirement that an air carrier be cer-
tificated. The Board was held to have exclusive jurisdiction over defendant as long as the exemption
lasted, because it had reserved power to terminate, suspend or revoke the certificate of registration.
332 F.2d at 609.
' ibid.
9Panagra, 371 U.S. 296, 305 (1963).
" However, in the instant case, it would appear that even had an injunction been granted, there
would have been no conflict with Panagra. Enjoining such activities as alleged here would not in-
terfere with the CAB's regulatory function because the court still finds that the matters are not
basic to the regulatory scheme of the Civil Aeronautics Act. See Fulda, A Critique of the Doctrine
of Primary Jurisdiction, 13 ABA Antitrust Section Rep. 68, 78 (1958).
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issue cease and desist orders, all of the cases indicate that where a determi-
nation is needed requiring administrative expertise or uniformity of
regulation, deference should be given to the Board if the plaintiff is seek-
ing an injunction against conduct appearing to be subject to the Civil
Aeronautics Act. The conflict arises through interpretation, i.e., deciding
what kinds of conduct are subject to the act, and what kinds of conduct
require expertise or uniformity. Yet, perhaps inconsistency inheres in
the doctrine because of its very nature," and because it seeks to pro-
vide flexibility.' It is submitted, however, that interpretation should
be the only source of inconsistency. The question of the kind of relief
sought ought not to be of any functional significance until the court has
first determined whether the subject matter calls for such uniformity or
expertise as to require the doctrine's operation. A complaint seeking dam-
ages should only be a factor in determining exclusive jurisdiction.
Although TWA v. Hughes does not resolve the conflict, it does offer a
guide as to what matters involving an airline and its controller do not
require uniformity or expertise. After the CAB has approved control'
and issued its orders, if the controller attempts to monopolize commerce
by requiring the airline to boycott the controller's competitors and by
refusing to finance aircraft acquisitions unless the airline agree to pur-
chase from no supplier other than the controller, then the Board is not
entitled to primary jurisdiction. If the CAB has already acted, the rationale
behind Far East, where the FMB had never considered the agreement, dis-
appears, and there arises a situation somewhat analogous to Isbrandtsen. In
fact, primary jurisdiction was specifically held inapplicable in an antitrust
case where the CAB had already acted upon the agreement involved."3 The
court in the instant case believed that the disposition of the matters alleged
"would not intrude upon the Board's function of fashioning the broad
framework of control for the commercial air industry. '"
John E. McFall
"' Mitchell, Primary Jurisdiction-What It Is and What It Is Not, 13 ABA Antitrust Section
Rep. 26, 41 (1958). "Inconsistency is to some extent inherent in the application of the doctrine
because different courts will have different ideas on how statutory purposes and the respective roles
of cousts and administrative agencies can best be accommodated."
101 "[T]he outstanding feature of the doctrine is properly said to be its flexibility permitting
the courts to make a workable allocation of business between themselves and the agencies." CAB
v. Modern Air Transport, Inc., 179 F.2d 622, 625 (1950).
'Because Toolco had placed its stock in TWA in a voting trust in 1960, it appears that
Toolco, since then, has not actually been TWA's controller within the meaning of Section 408
of the act. 332 F.2d at 609. A more recent case, Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 339 F.2d
56 (2d Cir. 1964), seems to reinforce this conclusion by holding that the Board must hold "a
hearing before issuing its order permitting Toolco to resume control of TWA." 339 F.2d at 62.
... Putnam v. Air Transport Ass'n of America, 112 F. Supp. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
'04 332 F.2d at 609.
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